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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects of medium-run shocks, such as 
increased capital intensity and skill-biased technical change, on wage inequality and 
unemployment with capital-skill complementarity technology in a unionized economy, 
which implies that efficient bargaining determines wages and employment in the skilled 
labor market of advanced countries. We develop our analysis using the three-factor, two-
level CES monopolistic competitive general equilibrium framework. We show the 
contrasting outcomes of wage inequality and unemployment. Increasing capital intensity 
can facilitate compression of wage inequality and unemployment only in unskilled labor 
with some relevant capital-skill complementarity. However, even with the same relevant 
capital-skill complementarity, skill-based technical change is likely to create not only 
increasing wage inequality but also unemployment of both skilled and especially 
unskilled labor. Furthermore, the implications of labor market deregulation reflecting 
globalization are investigated. In particular, we show that when the reservation wage in 
the skilled labor market is perfectly sensitive to the unskilled wage, the movements of 
wages and employment in both skilled and unskilled labors can synchronize. Thus, the 
effects of medium-shocks on wage inequality, income inequality, and unemployment of 
both skilled and unskilled labors are likely to be enhanced. 
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of medium-run shocks within a 
unionized economy on wage inequality and unemployment. As Blanchard and Giavazzi 
(2003) have clearly shown, combining the models of monopolistic competition and 
efficient bargaining provides a useful framework to analyze the effects of macroeconomic 
deregulation on goods and labor markets. As the monopolistic competitive goods market 
determines the size of rent and efficient bargaining determines the distribution of rent 
between firms and their employees, it is possible to examine the effects of market 
deregulation on income inequality that currently prevails in OECD countries.1 
However, to analyze the issues surrounding contemporary income inequality, other 
factors influencing this inequality are needed. For instance, Autor (2014) suggests that 
the three forces of technological change, deunionization, and globalization, create income 
inequality. According his suggestion, we need to add elements of new technologies such 
as advanced information and communication technology (ICT), computerization and 
artificial intelligence in order to explain one of the main contributing factors to the recent 
rise in income inequalities to Blanchard and Giavazzi’s (2003) framework.2 
In this paper, we introduce capital-skill complementarity technology to develop the 
monopolistic competitive framework with efficient bargaining into a three-factor model 
and explore the effects of technological change, unionization, and globalization on 
income inequalities. In our model, which is based on a three-factor nested two-level CES 
production technology,3 the capital-skill complementarity production technology and a 
skill-biased technical change capture the implications of new technology such as 
advanced ICT and computerization. In addition, the flexibility of reservation wage in the 
skilled labor market captures the implication of deunionization or the market 
deregulation. Furthermore, the increase in capital reflects the increase in the number of 
firms due to implications of globalization. 
Using our framework, we explore the effects of medium-run shocks on inequalities and 
employment in the monopolistic competitive general equilibrium. 4  To analyze the 
implication of deuionization, we then compare the case where the reservation wage in the 
skilled labor market is constant with that in which the reservation wage is linked to the 
                                                     
1 See Atkinson et al. (2011) and Piketty (2014). 
2 See Acemoglu (2002), Saint-Paul (2008), and Acemoglu and Autor (2011). 
3 For a pioneering work, see Sato (1967). For the empirical evidence, see Griliches (1969) and 
Krusell et al. (2000). 
4 For a different context, see Nickell and Layard (1999), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000). 
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unskilled wages. 
Our main findings are as follows. In some empirically relevant capita-skill 
complementarity, when the reservation wage in the skilled labor market is constant, the 
increase in demand countercyclically decreases income inequality and fluctuates more in 
unskilled employment. In contrast, the increase in capital compresses wage inequality and 
increasing unemployment in unskilled labor. Skill-biased technical change can increase wage 
inequality and has the possibility of increasing unemployment in both skilled and unskilled labor. 
Both cases can create income inequality. However, when the reservation wage dependent on the 
unskilled wage implies labor market deregulation, the movement of wages and employment in 
skilled labor can synchronize with the movement of these in unskilled labor. Thus, these medium-
shocks can create wage inequality, income inequality, and moreover, unemployment in both 
skilled and unskilled labor, especially more unemployment in unskilled labor. Hence, our analysis 
confirms the conjecture of Autor (2014) that ongoing new technology, deunionization, and 
globalization can create inequalities5, and furthermore we add that these three factors 
increase unemployment, particularly of unskilled labor and that our research can offer 
policy implications.  
 The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 
analyzes the effects of medium-run shocks. Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2. Model: Monopolistic Competition, Efficient Bargaining with Capital-Skill 
Complementarity 
 
2.1 Partial equilibrium  
We develop a general equilibrium model by incorporating a three-factor nested two-level 
CES production technology 6  that reflects capital-skill complementarity in order to 
analyze the effect of shocks on wage inequalities and unemployment. First, we define our 
model and then present the short-run partial equilibrium. Finally, we describe the short-
run general equilibrium in monopolistic competition. 
 
Production function 
We consider a three-factor weakly separable sub-aggregate production function where 
                                                     
5 See Fitoussi, et al. (2000), Bliss (2007), Acemoglu and Autor (2011), and Bourguignon (2015). 
See also Acemoglu, et al. (2001). 
6 See Sato (1967). 
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Y is the output, 1L is skilled labor, 2L is unskilled labor, K is the capital stock, and A is 
skill augmenting technology that represents a skill-biased technical progress. 
  ),,( 21 KLALfy =                              (1) 
[ ] )1/(/)1(22)1/()1(/)1(1/)1(112 222221121111 )1(}])1()({[ σσσσσσσσσσσσ δδδδ −−−−−− −+−+= LKAL .  
We assume that each production function is twice differentiable and homogenous of 
degree one and specify, for convenience, a nested two-level CES production function 
having two elasticity parameters, the elasticity of substitution between capital and skilled 
labor 1σ  and the elasticity of substitution between capital and unskilled labor 2σ . In 
this specification, 12 σσ >  gives a capital-skill complementarity technology
7 that has 
been widely estimated (Krusell, et al. 2000, Hornstein, et al. 2005) and we deal with this 
ongoing new technical progress. In particular, we mainly deal with 12 1 σσ >>  an 
empirically relevant capital-skill complementarity. 8 
 
Goods market 
In a monopolistic competitive goods market, each firm behaves as a price setter and 
determines its own price of goods, output and unskilled employment to maximize current 
profit subject to the following expected demand for the goods produced by each firm 
        εη −= )/( Ppy ii ,                                       (2) 
where η  is the average demand for each firm, ip  is price set by firm i, P is the 
aggregate price level, and ε is the elasticity of demand of each firm with respect to 
relative prices and 1>ε is assumed.9 
                                                     
7 Capital-skill complementarity is indicated as an inequality that the elasticity of complementarity 
between capital and skilled labor is larger than that between capital and unskilled labor 
)/()/( 222111 KKKKKK ffffcffffc =>= . Here, jiijij ffffc /≡ is defined as a partial 
elasticity of complementarity between i and j. Our two-level CES production technology 
specifies )/1)(( 22121121 fLfcc KK −−=− −− σσ  since  
1
222
1
2
1
11 )/1)((
−−− +−−= σσσ fLfc K ,  122 −=σKc . Thus, 12 σσ >  implies KK cc 21 > . 
We later refer 12 σσ >  as capital-skill complementarity.  
8 See Duffy, et al. (2004) and Hornstein, et al. (2005). 
9 Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) specify each firm’s elasticity of demand with respect to 
relative prices as )(mhεε ≡ , an increasing function of the number of firms m . This 
specification enables us to analyze the effect of globalization because a larger number of 
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Labor market 
In the labor market, there is skilled labor and unskilled labor. We assume that skill 
differences and implicit institutional factors create labor market segmentation. In the 
skilled labor market, we assume that a Nash bargaining between each firm and its skilled 
workers within firm determines wages iW1  and employment iL1 .
10  This efficient 
bargaining is to maximize the weighted value of product of their surpluses. 
ρρεεη ))](([]),,([( 211
1
2211
/11
21
/1 wPgWLLWLWPKLALf iiiiiii −−−
−− .       (3) 
Here, since PKLALf ii
εεη /1121
/1 ),,( − is the revenue of each firm,
iiiii LWLWPKLALf 2211
/11
21
/1 ),,( −−− εεη  expresses the profit of each firm. 
))(( 211 wPgWL ii −  represents the surplus received by skilled workers. )( 2wg  is the 
reservation wage of the skilled worker that is assumed to be an increasing function of real wage 
of unskilled labor 0'>g . 2w  is the real wage of unskilled labor evaluated by the price level. 
ρ  expresses the strength of relative bargaining power of skilled workers. The reason why we 
assume this type of wage bargaining is that the outcome of efficient bargaining can easily 
indicate the implications of distributable rent going to workers and firms. The decline of 
relative bargaining power of skilled labor implies deregulation of the labor market. 
Alternatively, as previously mentioned, unskilled employment is determined by the profit 
maximization of each firm. However, the solution of Nash maximization with respect to 
2L  and that of profit maximization is the same. We simply assume that unskilled wages 
are given in the short-run partial equilibrium.  
The solutions of Nash bargaining and of profit maximization provide the short-run 
partial equilibrium. This is demonstrated by the following three equations: 
)(),,(),,()11( 2211
/1
21
/1 wgKLALAfKLALf iiii =−
− εεη
ε
,                (4) 
iiiii LLwKLALfwgw 122
/11
21
/1
21 /]),,([)()1( −+−=
− εεηρρ ,             (5) 
2212
/1
21
/1 ),,(),,()11( wKLALfKLALf iiii =−
− εεη
ε
,                     (6) 
                                                     
firms, which reflects more competitiveness, increases the elasticity of substitution 
between commodity goods. In this respect, it seems difficult to analyze the effect of 
globalization because our model assumes ε is constant. However, we can analyze the 
implication of globalization if the increase in capital K is interpreted as the increase in 
the number of firms.  
10 For efficient bargaining, see McDonald and Solow (1981), Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), and 
Layard et al. (2005). See also Spector (2004). 
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where PKLALAfKLALf iiii ),,(),,()
11( 211
/1
21
/1 εεη
ε
−−  is the marginal revenue of skilled 
labor and PKLALfKLALf iiii ),,(),,()
11( 212
/1
21
/1 εεη
ε
−−  is the marginal revenue of 
unskilled labor, respectively. As is known, equation (4) represents the vertical contract 
curve and equation (5) represents the equity locus, and both determine the efficient 
employment and wages of skilled labor. Equation (6) simply indicates that the marginal 
revenue of unskilled labor equal to unskilled labor wage determines the employment of 
unskilled labor. We have two remarks on equations (4) and (5). The first is that the vertical 
contract line is derived from the risk neutral preference of both parties and implies that 
employment is determined in such a way that the marginal product of skilled labor is 
equal to the reservation wage. Thus, the bargaining power of skilled workers has no 
allocative effect on employment. The second is that the skilled labor wages set by 
bargaining have the distributable rent going proportionally to the skilled workers and that 
the firm exhibits labor hoarding implying that skilled labor employment is larger than 
skilled labor demand at the bargained wages.  
 
2.2 General equilibrium 
Next, we develop the short-run general equilibrium in the monopolistic competition. The 
short run means K  is constant. The general equilibrium in monopolistic competition 
requires that the price set by each firm is equal to the aggregate price Ppi = , and each 
firm is identical so that η=iy , 11 LL i = , 22 LL i = , KKi = , 11 ww i = . It implies that 
the equilibrium revenue becomes Pη , thus the equilibrium marginal revenue of each 
labor is reduced to PKLALAf ),,()11( 211ε
−  and PKLALf ),,()11( 212ε
− . From equations 
(4), (5) and (6), the short-run general equilibrium is given by as follows:  
)(),,()11( 2211 wgKLALAf =− ε
,                                 (7a) 
12221 /])/[()()1( LLwmYwgw −+−= ρρ ,                         (7b) 
   
2212 ),,()
11( wKLALf =−
ε
,                                       (7c) 
η=),,( 21 KLALf .                                              (7d) 
The four equations provide four endogenous variables 2121 ,,, wwLL .
11 
                                                     
11 Note that in general equilibrium, the reservation wage of skilled labor is endogenously 
determined. This determination differs from that in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003). 
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3. Effects of the Medium-Run Shocks 
3.1 Case where the reservation wage is constant (ν = 0) 
We first examine the case where the reservation wage in skilled labor is constant 
( 0/' 2 =≡νgwg ). Then we examine the case where the reservation wage is perfectly dependent 
on the secondary wage ( 1/' 2 =≡νgwg ). Comparing these results, there is an implication of 
deunionization of the skilled labor market. In other words, we can see the implication of labor 
market deregulation. In the case where the reservation wage is constant, the general equilibrium 
is given by as follows: 
wKLALAf =− ),,()11( 211ε
,                                     (8a) 
1221 /)()1( LLwww −+−= ηρρ ,                               (8b) 
   
2212 ),,()
11( wKLALf =−
ε
,                                     (8c) 
η=),,( 21 KLALf .                                            (8d) 
Here, w is the constant reservation wage in skilled labor. Specifying ijij fLf / in our weak 
separable two-level CES production technology12, total differentiation in (8a) and (8b) 
gives the following matrix. 





 −+− −−−
ba
bbabc 12
1
2
1
1 )1/()( σσσ






2
1
ˆ
ˆ
L
L
= 





1
0
ηˆ + 





−
−−− −−
c
bbc )1/()( 12
1
1 σσ Kˆ    (9) 
+ 





−
−−+− −−
a
babc 1)1/()( 12
1
1 σσ Aˆ  
where )/( 11 fLfa ≡ is the elasticity of output with respect to skilled labor, )/( 22 fLfb ≡  
is the elasticity of output with respect to unskilled labor, )/( fKfc K≡  is the elasticity 
of output with respect to capital, 1=++ cba , and )/(ˆ xdxx ≡  is the percentage change 
in x . Combining total differentiation in (8b) and (8c) and the outcomes of the matrix, and by 
rearranging the matrix, we have the effects of three medium-run parameters on employment, 
wages and wage inequality, and labor shares. We first analyze the effect of the demand for goods 
                                                     
12 Our two-level CES production function specifies ijij fLf / as follows: 
 0)1/()(/ 12
1
11111 <−+−=
−− babcfLf σσ , 0/ 121212 >=
−σbfLf ,  
0/ 122121 >=
−σafLf ,   0)1(/ 122222 <−−=
−σbfLf . 
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whose fluctuation reflects the business cycle13, and then subsequently investigate the effects of 
capital intensity and skill-biased technical change. 
 
(i) Demand shock:  
We first derive the effects of increasing demand for goods on employment in both skilled 
and unskilled labor as follows: 
01ˆ/ˆ 121 >∆
−
= −ση bL                                          (10a) 
0)(
1
11ˆ/ˆ 12
1
12 >+−∆
−
= −− σση abc
b
L                                (10b) 
)(
1
1ˆ/ˆˆ/ˆ 12
1
112
−− −
−∆
−
=− σσηη b
b
cLL                                (10c) 
where ∆  is the determinant of the matrix and its value is negative. 
  0)(
1
1
2
1
1 <+−
−
=∆ −− σσ ac
b
b .                                     (11) 
The effects on wages and wage inequality are given as:  



 −−+−−−
−∆
−
= −−−− 12
1
1
1
2
1
1
11
1 )
11)(1()}11(1{1
1
1ˆ/ˆ σσ
ε
σ
ε
σ
ε
ρη bb
Lw
R
b
bcw        (12a) 
01ˆ/ˆ 12
1
12 <∆
= −− σση cw                                           (12b) 



−−−
−∆
−
=− −− 12
11
1
1
11
21 )}
11(1{
1
1ˆ/ˆˆ/ˆ σρ
ε
σρ
ε
ηη
Lw
Rbb
Lw
Rb
b
cww  



−+−+ −− 12
1
1
11
})11(1){1( σσρ
ε Lw
Rbb   (12c) 
Furthermore, we obtain the effects on each labor share )/( 111 YLwsL ≡ , )/( 222 YLwsL ≡  and 
income inequality 
21
/ LL ss as follows: 
1ˆ/ˆˆ/ˆˆ/ˆ 111 −+= ηηη LwsL                                          (13a) 






−−+−−−+−
−∆
−
= −−−− 12
1
1
11
1
2
11
1
1
11
)11)(1(])}11(1{1[)11(
1
1 σσρ
ε
σρ
ε
σ
ε
ρ
Lw
Rb
Lw
Rb
Lw
R
b
bc
 
)1(11ˆ/ˆˆ/ˆˆ/ˆ 12
1
1222
−− −
∆
−
=−+= σσηηη cLwsL                             (13b) 
                                                     
13 See Teulings and Baldwin (2014). 
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


−−−+−
−∆
−
=− −− 12
11
1
1
11
])}11(1{1[)1(
1
1ˆ/ˆˆ/ˆ
21
σρ
ε
σ
ε
ρηη
Lw
Rbb
Lw
R
b
css LL         (13c) 



−+−+ −− 12
1
1
11
})11(1){1( σσρ
ε Lw
Rbb  
Summarizing the outcomes yields the following proposition.  
 
Proposition 1  
In the framework of monopolistic competitive general equilibrium and efficient 
bargaining, with some empirically relevant capital-skill complementary production 
technology 12 1 σσ >> and the reservation wage of skilled labor being constant, the 
following statements hold.  
During a boom in the business cycle, wage inequality can procyclically increase but income 
inequality can countercyclically decrease. That is, in the case of former, skilled wage increases 
but unskilled wage decreases, thus wage inequality can increase. In the latter, however, skilled 
labor share decreases but unskilled labor share increases, and thereby income inequality can 
decrease. Furthermore, unskilled employment fluctuates more in the business cycle. 
 
 
[Insert Figures 1a and 1b] 
 
Figures 1a and 1b show the proposition. Note that capital-skill complementarity technology 
plays a significant role in the movement of employment and wage inequality because it 
produces relatively skilled labor as a quasi-fixed factor and unskilled labor as a flexible 
factor. Therefore, employment of unskilled labor becomes a buffer variable in the 
business cycle and wage inequality also occurs. This implies that other production 
technology does not provide the same property. For instance, if we have Cobb-Douglas 
technology, skilled wages, and labor shares do not change, and thereby, in this case, 
neither does income inequality. Next, we analyze the effects of medium-run shocks. 
 
(ii) Capital increase: 
We derive the effects of an increase in capital on both employment in skilled and unskilled 
labor as follows: 
)(
1
1ˆ/ˆ 12
1
11
−− −
−∆
−
= σσ
b
bcKL                                    (14a) 
01ˆ/ˆ 112 <∆
= −σcKL                                         (14b) 
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ηησσ ˆ/ˆˆ/ˆ)(
1
1ˆ/ˆˆ/ˆ 12
1
2
1
121 LLbb
cKLKL −=−
−∆
−
=− −−                 (14c) 
The effects of the capital increase on wages, wage inequality, besides labor shares and income 
inequality are expressed by the following equation. These effects are all equal to those of the 
demand increase in absolute value.  
ηˆ/ˆˆ/ˆ 11 wKw −=                                              (15a) 
0ˆ/ˆˆ/ˆ 22 >−= ηwKw                                           (15b) 
ηη ˆ/ˆˆ/ˆˆ/ˆˆ/ˆ 2121 wwKwKw +−=−                                   (15c) 
ηˆ/ˆˆ/ˆˆ/ˆˆ/ˆ
11 11 LL
sKLKwKs −=+=                                 (16a) 
ηˆ/ˆˆ/ˆˆ/ˆˆ/ˆ
22 22 LL
sKLKwKs −=+=                                (16b) 
ηη ˆ/ˆˆ/ˆˆ/ˆˆ/ˆ
2121 LLLL
ssKsKs +−=−                                     (16c) 
(iii) Skill-biased technical change: 
We finally derive the effects of skill-biased technical change on employment in both 
skilled and unskilled labor, wages, wage inequality, labor shares, and income inequality as 
follows: 
)(
1
1ˆ/ˆ 12
1
11
−− −−+
−∆
−
= σσ acca
b
bAL                                (17a) 
01ˆ/ˆ2 <∆
= aAL                                                 (17b) 
)}({
1
11ˆ/ˆˆ/ˆ 12
1
121
−− +−+
−∆
−
=− σσ acbbca
b
ALAL                        (17c) 



 −+−−+−−
−∆
−
= −− }1)1(){1()}11(1{
1
1ˆ/ˆ 12
1
1
11
1 ε
σ
ε
σ
ε
ρ ccbabc
Lw
R
b
bAw      (18a) 
01ˆ/ˆ 122 >∆
−
= −σaAw                                             (18b) 
1
2
11
1
1
11
21 )1()}
11(1{
1
11ˆ/ˆˆ/ˆ −− +−+


−−
−∆
−
=− σρ
ε
σρ
ε
b
Lw
Rba
Lw
Rbbc
b
AwAw  



−+−−
11
}1)1(){1(
Lw
Rccbb ρ
ε
  (18c) 






−+−−+−+−−−
−∆
−
= −− ]}1)1({1)[1()11(]1)}11(1[{
1
1ˆ/ˆ
11
1
2
11
1
1
11
1 Lw
Rccb
Lw
Ra
Lw
Rbc
b
bAsL
ρ
ε
σ
ε
ρσρ
ε
                
                                                             (19a) 
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)1(1ˆ/ˆ 12
1
12
−− −
∆
= σσaAsL                                           (19b) 
1
2
11
1
1
11
)1(]1)}11(1[{
1
11ˆ/ˆˆ/ˆ
21
−− −+


−−−
−∆
−
=− σρ
ε
σρ
ε Lw
Rba
Lw
Rbbc
b
AsAs LL  



−+−+−+ ]}1)1({)[1(
11Lw
Rccbbab ρ
ε
  (19c) 
Summarizing these outcomes, we have the following proposition.  
 
Proposition 2  
In the framework of monopolistic competitive general equilibrium and efficient 
bargaining, with some empirically relevant capital-skill complementary production 
technology and the reservation wage of skilled labor being constant, the following 
statements hold.  
 
(1) Contrary to the case of business cycle boom, the increase in capital intensity has a 
compressive effect on wage inequality but an unfavorable effect on income inequality. That is, in 
the case of the former, the increase in capital intensity decreases skilled wage but unskilled wage 
increases, thereby decreasing wage inequality. In the case of the latter, however, this increase in 
capital increases skilled labor share but decreases unskilled labor share, and thus increases 
income inequality. Although the increase in capital can increase skilled employment, it decreases 
unskilled employment and consequently increases unskilled unemployment.  
 
(2) Although the mechanism differs, skill-biased technical change is likely to increase both wage 
and income inequality. In the case of the former, it increases skilled wage more than unskilled 
wage, thereby increasing wage inequality. However, in the case of the latter, it increases skilled 
labor share but decreases that of unskilled labor, and thereby increasing income inequality. 
However, this biased technical progress has the possibility of decreasing both skilled and 
unskilled labor, in particular increasing unskilled unemployment. 
 
 
[Insert Figures 2a, 2b, 3a and 3b] 
 
 
Figures 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b show the proposition. We make two remarks. First, there is symmetry 
between the effects of increasing demand and those of increasing capital. This is because the 
12 
 
relationship between output and capital is only statically dependent on the production technology. 
Thus, the symmetry of these results may change in the dynamic process where capital 
accumulation occurs. Second, in the empirically relevant capital-skill complementarity, among 
the medium-run shocks, the skill-biased technical change tends to make unskilled labor more of 
a buffer variable with regards to wages and unemployment. This is due not only to the nature of 
biased technology that increases skilled wages, but also the asymmetric structure of production 
technology that allows unskilled labor to be a more flexible factor and the bargaining structure 
that stabilizes skilled wages and protects skilled workers. Therefore, the results change if we have 
another production technology and/or bargaining structure. For example, if we have a Cobb-
Douglas technology, wages and employment in skilled labor, and labor shares in both sectors do 
not change. As shown in the next section, if some deregulation occurs in skilled labor, results can 
also change. 
 
3.2 Case where the reservation wage is perfectly dependent on the unskilled 
wage (ν =1) 
Finally, we investigate the case where the reservation wage in skilled labor is no longer 
constant but depends on the unskilled wage. This analysis explores the effect of 
deregulation on the skilled labor market. We find in some conditions, wages and 
employment in skilled labor are likely to synchronize with those in unskilled labor. In 
this case, we have the following general equilibrium: 
)(),,()11( 2211 wgKLALAf =− ε
,                                  (7a) 
12221 /)()()1( LLwwgw −+−= ηρρ ,                            (7b) 
   
2212 ),,()
11( wKLALf =−
ε
,                                        (7c) 
η=),,( 21 KLALf .                                              (7d) 
Total differentiation in (7a), (7c), and (7d) produces the following matrix: 





 −+− −−−
ba
bac 12
1
2
1
1 )1/()( σσσ






2
1
ˆ
ˆ
L
L
= 





1
0
ηˆ + 





−
−−− −−
c
bc )1/()( 12
1
1 σσ Kˆ  
+ 





−
−−+ −−
a
bac 1)1/()( 12
1
1 σσ Aˆ  (20) 
Combining the total differentiation in (7b) and the matrix outcomes, and by rearranging it, we 
have the effects of the three parameters on employment, wages and wage inequality, and labor 
shares. The analyses provide the outcomes as follows. 
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(i) Demand shock: 
We derive the effects of increasing demand for goods on both employment in skilled and 
unskilled labor as follows: 
0
'
1ˆ/ˆ 121 >∆
−
= −σηL                                          (21a) 
0)(
1
1
'
1ˆ/ˆ 12
1
12 >+−∆
−
= −− σση ac
b
L                             (21b) 
)(
1'
1ˆ/ˆˆ/ˆ 12
1
112
−− −
−∆
−
=− σσηη
b
cLL                             (21c) 
where '∆  is the determinant of the matrix and its value is negative: 
  0)(
1
1' 12
1
1 <+−
−
=∆ −− σσ abc
b
.                                 (22) 
The effects on wages, wage inequality, labor shares and income inequality are as follows14: 






−−−−−−
−∆
−
= −−−− 12
1
1
11
1
2
11
1
1
11
1 )1)(1()}
11(1{
1'
1ˆ/ˆ σσρσρ
ε
σ
ε
ρη
Lw
Rb
Lw
Rbb
Lw
R
b
cw  (23a) 
0
'
1ˆ/ˆ 12
1
12 <∆
= −− σση cw                                            (23b) 



 −+−−−
−∆
−
=− −−−− 12
1
1
1
2
1
1
11
21 )1()}
11(1{
1'
1ˆ/ˆˆ/ˆ σσσ
ε
σ
ε
ρηη bbb
Lw
R
b
cww       (23c) 



−−−+−
−∆
−
= −− 12
11
1
1
11
])}11(1{1[)11(
1'
1ˆ/ˆ
1
σρ
ε
σρ
ε
η
Lw
Rb
Lw
Rb
b
csL   



−−− −− 12
1
1
11
)1)(1( σσρ
Lw
Rb  (24a) 
)1(
'
1ˆ/ˆ 12
1
12
−− −
∆
−
= σση csL                                          (24b) 



−−−+−
−∆
−
=− −− 12
11
1
1
11
)}]11(1{1[)1(
1'
1ˆ/ˆˆ/ˆ
21
σ
ε
ρσ
ε
ρηη b
Lw
Rb
Lw
R
b
css LL  



−+ −− 12
1
1
11
)1( σσρ b
Lw
R  (24c) 
                                                     
14 From ))(11)((
)}11(1{)11()1(
1
11
ρ
ε
ε
ρ
ε
ρ
ρρ
−
+
−+
−−+−−
=−
ba
aba
baLw
R , 
we have 01
11
>−
Lw
Rρ  if 
ba
a
+
<ρ . 
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(ii) Capital increase: 
The effects of the increase in capital on both employment in skilled and unskilled labor 
are as follows: 
)(
1'
1ˆ/ˆ 12
1
11
−− −
−∆
−
= σσb
b
cKL                                    (25a) 
0
'
1ˆ/ˆ 112 <∆
= −σcKL                                           (25b) 
ηησσ ˆ/ˆˆ/ˆ)(
1'
1ˆ/ˆˆ/ˆ 12
1
2
1
121 LLb
cKLKL −=−
−∆
−
=− −−                  (25c) 
Similar to the previous case of constant reservation wage, the effects of this capital increase on 
wages, wage inequality, labor shares, and also income inequality, which are equal to those of the 
demand increase in absolute value, are provided as follows: 
ηˆ/ˆˆ/ˆ 11 wKw −=                                              (26a) 
0ˆ/ˆˆ/ˆ 22 >−= ηwKw                                           (26b) 
ηη ˆ/ˆˆ/ˆˆ/ˆˆ/ˆ 2121 wwKwKw +−=−                                  (26c) 
ηˆ/ˆˆ/ˆ
11 LL
sKs −=                                              (27a) 
ηˆ/ˆˆ/ˆ
22 LL
sKs −=                                              (27b) 
ηη ˆ/ˆˆ/ˆˆ/ˆˆ/ˆ
2121 LLLL
ssKsKs +−=−                                  (27c) 
(iii) Skill-biased technical change: 
We derive the effects of the skill-biased technical change on these variables as a whole 
as follows: 
})1({
1
1
'
1ˆ/ˆ 12
1
11
−− −−−
−∆
−
= σσ abcbb
b
AL                            (28a) 
0
'
1ˆ/ˆ2 <∆
= aAL                                               (28b) 
)(
1
1
'
1ˆ/ˆˆ/ˆ 12
1
121
−− −−+
−∆
−
=− σσ abcbca
b
ALAL                          (28c) 



+−+−−
−∆
−
= −− 12
11
1
1
11
1 )1()}
11(1{
1
1
'
1ˆ/ˆ σρ
ε
σρ
ε Lw
Rbba
Lw
Rbbc
b
Aw  



−+−−
11
}1)1(){1(
Lw
Rccbb ρ
ε
 (29a) 
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0
'
1ˆ/ˆ 122 >∆
−
= −σaAw                                             (29b) 



 −+−−+−−
−∆
−
=− −− }1)1(){1()}11(1{
1'
1ˆ/ˆˆ/ˆ 12
1
1
11
21 ε
σ
ε
σ
ε
ρ ccbabc
Lw
R
b
bAwAw (29c) 






−+−−+−+−−−
−∆
−
= −− ]}1)1({1)[1()11(]1)}11(1[{
1'
1ˆ/ˆ
11
1
2
11
1
1
11
1 Lw
Rccb
Lw
Ra
Lw
Rbc
b
bAsL
ρ
ε
σ
ε
ρσρ
ε
                       
                                                                
(30a) 
)1(
'
1ˆ/ˆ 12
1
12
−− −
∆
= σσaAsL                                          (30b) 
1
2
11
1
1
11
)1(]1)}11(1[{
1'
1ˆ/ˆˆ/ˆ
21
−− −+


−−−
−∆
−
=− σρ
ε
σρ
ε Lw
Rba
Lw
Rbbc
b
bAsAs LL  



−+−+−+ ]}1)1({)[1(
11Lw
Rccbbab ρ
ε
 (30c) 
Summarizing these outcomes yields the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3 
In the framework of monopolistic competitive general equilibrium and efficient 
bargaining, with some empirically relevant capital-skill complementary production 
technology and the reservation wage of skilled labor being highly sensitive to the 
secondary wage, the following statements hold.  
The movements of wages and employment in the skilled labor are likely to synchronize 
with the movements of those in unskilled labor. Although the consequences of the three 
shocks on wage inequality and income inequality almost hold, the consequences of such 
shocks on wages and employment in skilled labor differ from those in the case of a 
constant reservation wage. Namely:  
(1) In the business cycle boom, although the mechanism differs, the consequences that wage 
inequality can procyclically increase, income inequality can countercyclically decrease and 
employment of unskilled labor increases more almost hold. However, when the bargaining power 
of skilled labor is relatively low, the movement of skilled wage can synchronize with that of 
unskilled wage. Thus, both wages can countercyclically fluctuate. 
 
(2) Although the mechanism differs, the consequences that the increase in capital intensity has a 
compressive effect on wage inequality, but an unfavorable effect on income inequality almost 
hold. However, when the bargaining power of skilled labor is relatively low, the movements of 
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wages and employment in skilled labor tend to synchronize with those in the unskilled labor. Thus, 
the increase in capital can increase both wages and unemployment in both skilled and unskilled 
labor. However, the consequence that the capital increase can produce more unskilled 
unemployment is likely to still hold.  
 
(3) Although the mechanism differs, the consequences that skill-biased technical change is likely 
to lead to increase in both wage and income inequality almost hold. However, the movements of 
wages and employment in skilled labor tend to synchronize with the movements of those in 
unskilled labor. Thus, the skill-biased technical change can increase both wages and 
unemployment in both skilled and unskilled labor. However, the consequence that this technical 
change can produce more unskilled unemployment is likely to still hold. 
 
 
Table 1. Effects of shocks on wages, wage inequality, employment and labor shares  
 
1w   2w    21 / ww    1L   2L   21 / LL  1Ls  2Ls  21 / LL ss  
 
Constant reservation 
wage (ν = 0) 
               η     +   −     +     +    +    −     −    +    −  
              K      −    +    −    +    −    −      +    −    +  
          A      ?    +     ?     ?    −     ?      ?    −    ?  
Perfectly flexible  
reservation wage (ν = 1) 
               η      ?   −    +     ?     +     −    −    +     −  
              K      ?    +    −    ?     −    −      +    −     +  
          A      ?     +    ?     ?     −    ?      ?    −     ?  
 
Note: empirically relevant capital-skill complementarity case 12 1 σσ >>  
 
 
[Insert Figures 4a, 4b, 5a, 5b, 6a, and 6b] 
 
 
Table 1 summarizes the results. Figures 4a, 4b, 5a, 5b, 6a, and 6b show the proposition. We have 
two remarks. First, the proposition statements can apply if the relevant capital-skill 
complementarity production technologies do not have a structure that is too extreme. Specifically, 
if the two elasticities of substitution are near unity, and moreover the bargaining power of skilled 
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labor is low. It implies that these conditions induce the movements of wages and employment in 
skilled labor in order to synchronize with the movements of those in unskilled labor. Indeed, in 
the case of Cobb-Douglas technology, wages and employment in skilled and unskilled labor are 
perfectly synchronized, and thereby both wage inequality and income inequality do not occur. 
However, if there is larger substitutability between capital and unskilled labor and larger 
complementarity between capital and skilled labor, then the results are almost the same as those 
in the case of constant reservation. It implies that these cases of extreme production technology 
become technological barriers against economic shocks for skilled labor except in the case of 
capital increase.  
Second, even in the case of reservation wage flexibility, the deregulation of the skilled labor 
market can destabilize wages and employment in that market. In other words, the rigidity of the 
reservation wage in skilled labor can play an anchoring role for the stabilization of wages and 
employment in the skilled labor market. However, even if deregulation prevails, our results show 
that income inequality can occur even in the medium-run. 
 In sum, these consequences confirm the conjecture made by Autor (2014) that technological 
progress, deunionization, and globalization can produce wage inequality. Furthermore, our results 
add that the ongoing new technology and labor market deregulation can create inequalities 
and increasing unemployment, particularly in unskilled labor. Therefore, our analysis may 
suggest multi-dimensional policies for new technology and market deregulation. 
 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
Introducing capital-skill complementarity production technology into the framework that 
reflects the monopolistic competitive general equilibrium and efficient bargaining model, 
we explored the effects of medium-run shocks on inequalities prevailing in OECD 
countries and the implications of labor market deregulation. In particular, in some 
empirically relevant capita-skill complementarity, when there is labor market deregulation, 
such as the reservation wage in skilled labor depends on the unskilled wage, the movement of 
wages and employment in skilled labor can synchronize with the movement of these in unskilled 
labor. In this case, medium-shocks such as capital increase and skill-biased technical progress can 
create inequalities as well as unemployment in both labors, especially in unskilled labor. Hence, 
ongoing new technology, deunionization, and globalization can create inequalities and 
these factors also increase unemployment, particularly of unskilled labor.  
However, to analyze the effect on wage inequality and unemployment in the dynamic 
process, the approaches of capital accumulation and asset dynamics are needed. These 
issues are to be dealt with in future research. 
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Figure 1a Effect of demand shock in the case of constant reservation wage (ν = 0) 
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   Figure 1b Effect of demand shock in the case of constant reservation wage (ν = 0) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2a Effect of increasing capital in the case of constant reservation wage (ν = 0) 
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  Figure 2b Effect of increasing capital in the case of constant reservation wage (ν = 0) 
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Figure 3a Effect of skill-biased technical change in the case of constant reservation wage (ν = 
0)  
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Figure 3b Effect of skill-biased technical change in the case of constant reservation wage (ν = 
0) 
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     Figure 4a Effect of demand shock in the case of perfectly flexible reservation wage (ν = 1) 
          Case ρ < a/(a + b) 
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    Figure 4b Effect of demand shock in the case of perfectly flexible reservation wage (ν = 1)  
Case ρ < a/(a + b) 
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Figure 5a Effect of increasing capital in the case of perfectly flexible reservation wage (ν = 1) 
         Case ρ < a/(a + b). 
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  Figure 5b Effect of increasing capital in the case of perfectly flexible reservation wage (ν = 1) 
           Case ρ < a/(a + b) 
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Figure 6a Effect of skill-biased technical change in the case of perfectly flexible reservation 
wage (ν = 1) 
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Figure 6b Effect of skill-biased technical change in the case of perfectly flexible reservation 
wage (ν = 1) 
 
